We solve a multi-period model of strategic trading with long-lived information in multiple assets with correlated innovations in fundamental values. Market makers in each asset can only condition their price functions on trading in the that asset (but not on trading in the other asset). Using daily non-public data from the New York Stock Exchange we test the model's predictions on the lead-lag relations of institutional order flows and returns within portfolios. We find support for the model prediction of positive autocorrelations in portfolio returns as well as the predictions for how informed order flow positively predicts future returns and future informed order flow. As the model predicts we find these relations strengthen for portfolios formed from assets with higher correlation of fundamental values.
Introduction
Stocks prices following a random walk is the basis for much of theoretical and empirical asset pricing, e.g., the predictability of asset returns is the first non-introduction chapter in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) . Lo and MacKinley (1988) show that the autocorrelations of equalweighted portfolio returns are significantly positive while the autocorrelations of individual asset returns are generally negative. Together these point to positive cross-autocorrelations in asset returns (Lo and MacKinley (1990a) ). We study whether or not informed institutional trading is a source of these correlation patterns. We construct a multi-period model of strategic trading with long-lived information in multiple assets with correlated fundamental values. The model's key assumption is that in each trading period prices in each asset are function of only trading in that asset (and not trading in the other asset). We find support for the model's prediction of positive autocorrelations in daily portfolio returns as well as the predictions for how informed order flow positively predicts future returns and future informed order flow. We also test and find support for the model's comparative static predictions on the fundamental correlation of assets by examining portfolios formed from stocks in the same industry versus portfolios formed from stocks randomly chosen from different industries.
Explanations other than asymmetric information and the slow diffusion of information have been suggested to explain the positive autocorrelation in daily and weekly portfolio returns. Conrad and Kaul (1988) propose time varying risk premia. Lo and MacKinley (1990b) and Boudoukh, Richardson, and Whitelaw (1994) explore asynchronous trading. However, these have proven unsatisfactory, e.g., using several tests based on transaction data Anderson, Eom, Hahn, and Park (2008) find that partial price adjustment is the major source of the portfolio autocorrelations. Lo and MacKinley (1990b) , Brennan, Jagadeesh and Swaminathan (1993) , Chan (1993) , and others suggest that slow adjustment to common information is the source for partial price adjustment; but, Bernhardt and Mahani (2008) show that it is difficult to construct a model in which asymmetric information with strategic trading that leads to positive autocorrelations in portfolio returns.
We propose a simple friction that generates positive autocorrelation in portfolio returns in a multi-period Kyle (1985) style model with strategic trading on long-lived information in multiple assets with correlated innovations in the assets' fundamental values. The key assumption is that in each asset the market makers can only condition their pricing rule on trading in that asset. This friction exists in virtually all markets. 1 This same assumption arises from any friction that prevents market makers from perfectly observe trading in all other assets continuously and instantaneously. 2 Because assets' fundamental values are correlated, order flows in both assets are informative about payoffs in both assets.The informed trader strategically anticipate this by conditioning his orders in each asset on information not directly relevant to that asset's signal (the signal in the other asset).
The model has an analytical solution in the case of two assets traded over two trading rounds when assets have symmetrically distributed fundamental values and liquidity trades are independent across time and assets but have the same variance. The informed trader minimizes the informational impact of his trades in both assets by strategically choosing informational trading intensities across time and assets. The informed trader does this across time by curbing the aggressiveness of his trades in both assets in the first period in a manner similar to a two-period version of the original 1 Allowing orders to be contingent on trading in multiple asset can prevent market clearing as the contingencies on the different orders can be mutually exclusive.
2 In a model without informed trading Chan (1993) uses a similar assumption. In a model with informed trading Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2008) use a related assumption to examine short-lived information-the informed traders only have one period to trade on their information which is revealed before the informed can trade again. The short-lived information along with the assumption that common factor information is only traded on in the large stocks allows Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam to examine time variation in liquidity and information diffusion. Kyle (1985) model. His cross-asset strategy is quite different. Informed trader sets sensitivities of his trading demand in either asset to be positive in his information about the asset he trades in and negative in his information about the other asset. This signal jamming strategy reduces market maker's ability to learn about the value of either asset from both order flows.
The main time-series implication of the model is that individual assets' returns are independent across time, while returns on a portfolio of the assets are positively auto-correlated. The individual assets' returns are independent across time because asset-specific order flows are sufficient statistics for prices of their respective assets. In other words, the informed trader does not reuse any information he has traded on in the past since it has been already incorporated into the price.
This property of the model also makes current order flow independent of lagged returns.
The intuition behind positive cross-autocorrelation can be illustrated by the following example.
Suppose that there are two assets and that in the first trading round the market maker in the first asset receives a large order flow in his asset but cannot condition on order flow in the other asset.
Because the total order flow contains a noisy liquidity component, the market maker adjusts her assets's price only partially upward in response to the large order flow. After the transaction takes place, she examines the transaction price of the second asset and uncovers its order flow which contains additional information about her asset. If it is also large, she is more confident about the favorable information and adjusts her asset's price further upward. If it is low, she is less confident about the favorable information and revises the asset's price downward. Therefore, the price change of the first asset in the second trading round is positively correlated with the price change of the second asset in the first trading round.
The model predicts that portfolios lead-lag autocorrelations between returns and informed order flows increase in the correlation between innovations in the assets fundamental values, except for the correlation between informed order flow and lagged returns. The model also allows for a joint test of return and informed order flow predictability in a conventional vector autoregression setting.
We use daily non-public data from the New York Stock Exchange to test the model's predictions on the correlations of institutional order flows and returns within portfolios and within the asset making up the portfolios. The data set contains six years from January 1999 to December of 2005 of daily buy and sell volume of executed institutional investor orders for a large crosssection of NYSE stocks. 3 The data set was constructed from the NYSE's Consolidated Equity Audit Trail Data (CAUD) files that contain detailed information on all orders that execute on the exchange. One of the fields associated with each order, Account Type, specifies whether the order comes from an institution. We use institutional order flow (buy volume minus sell volume) normalized by the market cap as a data proxy for the informed order flow in the model. We first test model's predictions on the market portfolio. We find support for the model's predictions: positive autocorrelations in portfolio returns as well as the predictions for how informed order flow positively predicts future returns and future informed order flow, while returns do not predict informed order flow.
We also test and find support for the model's comparative static predictions on the fundamental correlation of assets by examining portfolios formed from stocks in the same industry versus portfolios formed from stocks randomly chosen from different industries. We show that the leadlag correlations between returns and informed order flow is higher in industry portfolio than in randomly formed portfolios. We also show that the relevant vector autoregression coefficients for industry portfolios are higher and lower, as predicted, than the same coefficients for random portfolios.
The the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Our empirical analysis are reported in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
The Model

Set Up
We consider an economy in which two risky assets 4 are traded in the financial market over two trading rounds. There are three types of risk-neutral agents in the economy: an informed trader, competitive market makers, and a number of liquidity ("noise") traders. At t = 0 the informed trader learns the fundamental values of both risky assets, V = (V 1 , V 2 ) , simultaneously drawn from the joint normal distribution
The statistical properties of the assets are summarized by the Assumption 1. Each asset is handled by competitive market makers. Market makers do not know V 1 and V 2 until the announcement after the second and final trading round. Before any trading takes place, market makers know the unconditional joint distribution of V and thus quote P(0) = E[ V] = 0 at t = 0. The aggregate liquidity demand in asset i = 1, 2 at time t = 1, 2, u (t) = (u 1 (t), u 2 (t)) , is normally distributed with zero mean and variance equal to σ u
where I is a 2 × 2 unit matrix. Assumption 2 outlines cross-sectional and intertemporal properties of the liquidity demands. This assumption simplifies the market makers' inference problem, but is not crucial.
ASSUMPTION 2:
The liquidity demands are independent across assets, Cov(u i (t) , u j (t)) = 0, and time, Cov(u i (1) , u i (2)) = 0. Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of events and the relative informativeness of all agents. In both trading rounds the informed trader takes into account correlation between assets by conditioning his demand in each asset, x(t) = (x 1 (t), x 2 (t)) , on the value of the other asset, V j . 6 The informed order flows at t = 1 are given by
and the corresponding total order flows, y(t) = (y 1 (t), y 2 (t)) , are given by
[insert Figure 1] During the trading rounds market makers observe order flows and use Bayes rule to update their beliefs about V 1 and V 2 . Assumption 3 outlines the strategies available to market makers. At a high enough frequency, Assumption 3 is consistent with the fact that no market structure allows market makers (or any traders) to condition their prices in one asset on trading in another asset.
Even if market makers could condition their pricing function in an asset on order flow in other assets, Assumption 3 is a reduced-form way of capturing any friction causing the market makers' inability to instantaneously and fully process and act on all information in all securities. Assumption 3 is crucial for our analysis. If market makers observe and condition prices on order flows in both assets, then as in Kyle (1985) prices would be fully informationally efficient:
information in the current order flow for either asset being orthogonal to the information in the next period order flow for both assets. As a result, order flows and, therefore, returns for individual assets and their equal-weighted portfolio would not be predictable.
When assumption 3 holds market makers condition prices only on their own order flows their prices are less than fully informationally efficient and the pricing error of the first asset is correlated with the order flow in the second asset. This is because the assets' fundamental values are correlated and, therefore, the order flows they do not observe contain additional information about the asset they make. Further, although each asset price is an unbiased estimate of the true asset value conditional on its own order flow, the sum of asset prices (the price of an equal-weighted portfolio) is not an unbiased estimate of the true aggregate value conditional on both order flows. Consequently, when market makers correct pricing errors using order flow inferred from the price change of the other asset, stock returns will be positively cross-autocorrelated.
In accordance with Assumption 3, competitive market makers observe the order flows in the assets they make and set prices at t = 1 according to the schedules
In the spirit of Kyle (1985) , the inverse market depth parameter λ i (1) in (5) is a slope coefficient 7 The informed trader acts strategically to take advantage of this inefficiency in order to maximize her expected profits.
in the linear regression of V i on y i (1):
refers to the elasticity of informed order flow to private information in Kyle (1985) .
At the end of the first trading round, t = 1 + , after trades take place market makers observe prices of assets they do not make. Market makers use posted prices to infer order flows they did not observe at the start of the first trading round and use them to adjust the prices of their assets to the full information level according to
where Λ ij are slope coefficients in the linear regression of V i on y j (1)
Evaluating the slope coefficients yields
where the covariance matrix of the fundamental values conditional on the order flows,
The "efficient" prices (7) are quoted to the informed trader at the start of the second trading round.
At the beginning of the second trading round, t = 2, the informed trader submits market orders
and market makers receive the following total order flows
Analogous to the first trading period, market makers can only condition their pricing functions on the order flows in each assets and not on the order flows in the other asset:
where the inverse market depth parameter λ (2) in (13) is the slope coefficient in the linear regression of :
At the end of the second trading round V is revealed to all agents and payoffs are realized.
Solution and Results
The model is solved by finding a vector of trading strategies, x * (t), which maximizes the informed trader's expected profits over both trading rounds
The following theorem summarizes the solution of the model. The symmetry of the assets' statistical properties together with the independence of liquidity demand across assets and time allow for the model to be solved up to a system of nonlinear equations. 
The market maker pricing function is P (1) = λ (1) (β (1) V + u (1)) = λ (1) y (1), with:
At time t = 1 + the asset prices are updated using both order flows P(1 + ) = Λy (1), with
Proof: All proofs are in the Appendix. with ρ. When the correlation between assets is zero β + is simply the first-period β in a standard 2-period Kyle (1985) model. Because the informed knows the final payoffs with certainty there is no reason to trade on the information in one asset in the other assets and the cross-asset β is zero, β − = 0. As the assets become more correlated, ρ increases, the informed trader increases his first-period trading intensity, β + . This is because the correlation of the assets improves the market makers ability to learn when using both assets. This makes the second-period prices P(1 + ) more information and decreases the profitability of the informed's second-period profits. Knowing this the informed increase his first-period trading intensity.
Because the asset correlation improves the market makers' learning from trading in both assets, the informed tries to disguise his first-period trading by negatively trading on the cross-asset information: β − is negative and decreasing in ρ. This negatively trading on information that is irrelevant to the final value of that asset, but relevant to the market makers' learning, reduces the informed trader's first-period profits. 8 However, jamming the market makers' inference problem increases the informed's second-period profits even more. This leads to the overall trading intensity dropping with the asset correlation, β − + β + decreases in ρ relative to β + (ρ = 0).
The signal jamming affects the market makers' pricing function in period 1, λ 1 from equation (17), and period 2, Λ + , Λ − , and λ 2 from equations (18) and (20). The parameters that characterize these are graphed in Panels B and C of Figure 2 . The optimal tradeoff between increasing the within asset trading intensity β + and decreasing the cross-asset trading intensity β − is reflected in the market makers updating after the first period trading. The within asset price impact function is given by Λ + and the cross-asset price impact Λ − . At ρ = 0 the price impact functions are the standard Kyle (1985) 2-period solution: Λ − = 0 and Λ + = λ 1 . As the correlation increases informed traders tries to jam the market maker by making β − more negative. Because the jamming is less than complete the effect of the correlation in signals is greater than the jamming and the maker maker responds by increasing the sensitivity of price the cross asset order flows at time t = 1 + , Λ − increases. The signal jamming does reduce the within asset price impact at time t = 1 + , Λ + .
Because signal jamming is costly to first-period profits, the informed trader only partially jams the signal and the total price impact at time t = 1 + , Λ + + Λ − , increases. The signal jamming also increases first-period depth as seen by the decrease in the t = 1 price impact λ 1 . The less than full signal jamming also means that more information in revealed before second trading period begins so the market makers use a smaller second period price impact λ 2 .
Using the equilibrium given in Theorem 1 we analyze the lead-lag correlations of individual assets' returns and informed order flows. As is standard we use incremental price changes,
, as a proxy for assets' returns. Proposition 1 summarizes the within asset and across asset lead-lag relations. In the data we will follow the usual convention of examining autocorrelations and cross-autocorrelations. We present covariances here because the expressions are simpler and of the same sign as the corresponding correlations.
PROPOSITION 1: The lead-lag covariances of assets' returns are given by
The lead-lag covariances of informed order flows are given by
Cov (
The lead-lag covariances of informed order flows and price returns are given by
and
The intuition behind the autocovariances and cross-autocovariances is straightforward. Because the informed trader strategically trades so as to not reveal all of his information in the first period the within asset informed order flow positively autocovary, Cov(x i (1), x i (2)) > 0. Because the assets final values are positively correlated the informed order flow has positive contemporaneous covariance, Cov(x 1 (1), x 2 (1)) > 0, this cross autocovariance is positive, Cov(x 1 (1), x 2 (2)) > 0.
Because order flow has positive price impact and the uniformed order flow is not observable to the market makers, the covariance of informed order flows with subsequent price changes has the positive signs as with subsequent informed order flow: Cov(x i (1), ∆P j (2)) > 0.
As is standard in Kyle models price changes in each asset are a martingale:
Cov(∆P i (1), ∆P i (2)) = 0. This is because asset-specific order flows are sufficient statistics for prices of their respective assets. In other words, the informed trader does not reuse any information he has traded on in the past because it has been already incorporated into the price. This property of the model also makes current order flows independent of lagged returns:
The positive cross-autocovariance in price changes can be illustrated as follows. Suppose that in the first trading round, the market maker in the first asset receives a large order flow in her asset but cannot observe the order flow in the other asset. Because the total order flow contains noisy liquidity component, the market maker adjusts her assets's price only partially upward in response to the large order flow. After transaction takes place, she examines the transaction price of the second asset and uncovers its order flow which contains additional information about her asset. If it is also large, she is more confident about the favorable information and adjusts her asset's price further upward. If it is low, she is less confident about the favorable information and revises the asset's price downward. Therefore, the price change of the first asset in the second trading round is positively correlated with the price change of the second asset in the first trading round.
Proposition 1's results on the within and cross asset autocovariances provide the intuition necessary to understand the results for a portfolio of the assets. Next we combine both assets into the equal-weighted portfolio
and study its lead-lag covariances in Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2: The equal-weighted portfolio of securities is characterized by the following lead-lag covariances
The portfolio autocoviances in Proposition 2 are averages of the within and across asset autocovariances in Proposition 1. Because within asset price changes have zero autocovariance and price changes have positive cross autocovariance the portfolio price changes positively autocovary.
Informed trading in each individual asset predicts subsequent informed order flow and price changes in both assets so the informed order flow in the portfolio has positive autocovariance with the subsequent informed order flow and price changes in the portfolio. Past price changes in each asset do not covary with subsequent order flow in either asset so consequently the price change of the portfolio has zero covariance with informed trading in the portfolio.
Empirical Tests
To test the empirical predictions of the model we need to choose a time horizon corresponding to the trading periods in the model. In our standard Kyle setting trading occurs in batches. Assumption 3 requires that the time period is short enough that the market makers cannot condition their trading on order flow in both assets. However, we also would like to see if effects of the friction in Assumption 3 are relevant at more than very short horizons. To balance these considerations we focus on daily returns and trading. We expect the effects to be larger at shorter horizons and attenuate at longer horizons. Below we examine correlations and regressions using lags longer than one and the results confirm the intuition that the results are stronger at shorter horizons. To proxy for informed order flow we will use a measure of institutional trading from the NYSE.
Data
The data set contains seven years of daily buy and sell volume of executed institutional investor orders for all NYSE common domestic stocks that were traded on the NYSE any time between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2005. The data set was constructed from the NYSE's Consolidated Equity Audit Trail Data (CAUD) files that contain detailed information on all orders that execute on the exchange, both electronic (from the limit order book) and manual (those handled by floor brokers). One of the fields associated with the buyer and seller of each order, Account Type, specifies whether the order comes from an institutional investor. We use the institutional order flow (buy volume minus sell volume) as a proxy for informed trading. The CAUD data was first provided to academics as part of the TORQ dataset constructed by Joel Hasbrouck.
Our CAUD data is complemented by the daily data on returns (CRSP and from closing quotes in TAQ), prices (CRSP), effective and quoted spreads (TAQ), trading volume (TAQ), and market capitalization (number of shares outstanding time price from CRSP).
Market-Level Tests
We begin testing the lead-lag portfolio relations between informed order flows and returns given in Proposition 2. To do this we construct an equal-weight market portfolio for returns and informed order flow for all stocks with available data each day. We use institutional order flow (buy volume minus sell volume) measured as a percent of a total market cap as a proxy for informed order flows in the model. Table 1 Unless such a large fraction of the total trading is due to informed trading the institutional trading proxy likely includes some noise trading as well, e.g., mutual funds facing redemptions. This does not affect the signs of the lead-lag covariances in Proposition 2, but can affect any analysis where both returns and our informed order flow proxy are both included as explanatory variables.
[insert Table 1] The model has 2 trading periods so our correlation calculations in Proposition 2 are for a single lag. As discussed above it is an open question as to what calendar time period corresponds to the trading periods in the model. Rather than simply assuming one day corresponds to one trading period, we will examine lags up to 4 days. This will also allow for time-series dependencies in returns and institutional order flow beyond one day.
The correlation results are shown in Table 2 [insert Table 2] In the data, however, cross-autocorrelations between informed order flows and returns can be the manifestation of the high autocorrelations of institutional order flow combined with a high contemporaneous correlation between institutional order flow and returns. Under such scenario, which is not precluded by our model, the lagged institutional order flow is a noisy proxy for the lagged returns and, once we control for lagged returns, the lead-lag effect will disappear. To address this alternative hypothesis we estimate joint autoregression described in Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3: Consider the following vector autoregression (VAR) of the equal-weighted portfolios
The coefficients b ij are given in the model by
Regression models similar to Proposition 3 are used in Brennan et al. (1993) and Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) to study the lead-lag relations between stocks with different levels of analyst coverage and trading volume and by Hou (2007) In Proposition 2 there is no relation between past prices changes and informed order flow.
However, liquidity trading is a component of returns.In the second period the informed trader trades against price changes due to noise. Thus, b 21 is negative. Price changes due to noise are subsequently reversed, but the informed order flow also includes noise due to the signal jamming (negative cross-asset β, β − ). This makes the coefficient on returns in the returns equation b 11 ambiguously signed.
We estimate equations (27) with one (K = 1) and four (Panel B, K = 4) lags in the data [insert Table 3] The signs of the coefficients on returns in the returns equation, the sum of a k , are ambiguous in Proposition 3 while positive and statistically significant in the data, at the 1% level for one-lag The coefficients on returns in the institutional order flow equation, the sum of c k , is negative in Proposition 3. In the data there is not relation between returns and subsequent informed order flow. This may be due to noise (non informed trading) in institutional order flow.
Industry-Level Test: The Impact of Asset Correlation (ρ)
While the market-level analysis is supportive of the model, the correlation in the fundamental values of the assets is a key driver of the model. To further study the model's relation to the data we examine how increasing this correlation (ρ) change the correlation and VAR coefficients in Testing the impact of ρ requires identification of assets that have higher or lower fundamental correlation. We follow Hou (2007) in using industry designation as a proxy for where the fundamental correlation is higher. We use the 12 industry SIC-code-based classifications from Ken French's website. The final of the 12 industries includes stocks that do not fit the first 11 industries and is referred to as "other." The "other" group is by far the largest group (763 stocks in our sample period as compared to the next largest which is "Manufacturing" with 314 stocks).
To ensure that all of our tests do not reuse any data we will use this other category to form random (non-industry) portfolios.
To construct portfolios we take stocks in the the first 11 industry portfolios and calculate returns and informed order flows as we did for the market portfolio. For the other category we randomly divide stocks in it into 11 portfolios and calculate returns and informed order flows for each. Thus, we have 22 portfolios where 11 are formed from stocks within the same industry and 11 which are formed from stocks chosen from random industries. To focus on the industry-level effects we remove the market-level effects from the within industry and random portfolios by using the residuals from the regression of returns (order flows) of each portfolio on the market returns (order flows). To avoid creating correlation in the residuals across the industry and random categories portfolios in each group are regressed on the "market" formed from stocks only within the 11 portfolios in the same category.
Similar to Table 2 for the market-level analysis, Table 4 examines the lead-lag correlations coefficients for the 11 portfolios formed within industries and the 11 randomly formed portfolios.
The correlation coefficients for each of the 22 portfolios are estimated individually. To allow for statistical inference that properly accounts for possible correlations across portfolios and time we estimate the full covariance matrix for the 22 coefficients via seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
with the Newey-West approach to control for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
[insert Table 4] Panel A of Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients for the 11 within industry portfolios.
Average coefficients across each category of portfolios are reported along with the corresponding F - Table 4 reports the correlation coefficients for the 11 randomly formed portfolios.
For the random portfolios the only autocorrelation that is reliably different from zero is order flow.
Given that lagged order flow is not positively correlated with returns, this suggests that institutional order flow that is orthogonal to the systematic institutional order has some persistent component that appears unrelated to information.
Panel C tests the differences in each correlation coefficient between the industry portfolios Using the same approach as Table 4, Table 5 presents the VAR for returns and order flows for the industry and random portfolios. As in Table 3 the VARs are estimated for both 1 lag and 4 lags. As with the correlation coefficients in Table 4 the VAR coefficients for each of the 22 portfolios are estimated individually. To allow for statistical inference that properly accounts for possible correlations all the VAR coefficients across the 22 portfolios are estimated simultaneously via seemingly unrelated regression (SUR).
[insert Table 5] Panel A of Table 5 
Conclusion
We solve a multi-period model of strategic trading with long-lived information in multiple assets with correlated innovations in fundamental values. The model assumes that market makers in assets cannot condition their price functions in either asset on trading in the other asset. Using daily non-public data from the New York Stock Exchange we test the model's predictions on the correlations of institutional order flows and returns within portfolios. We find support for the model prediction of positive autocorrelations in portfolio returns as well as the predictions for how informed order flow positively predicts future returns and future informed order flow. We also test the model's comparative static predictions for how the relations between informed order flow and returns depend on and the fundamental correlation of assets within a portfolio. We find support for many of these predicted relations in the data.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. The informed trader's total expected payoff, π I , is given by
where the expectation is performed with respect to both the liquidity demand and the realizations of the fundamentals 9 . Combining (A1) with (5), (7), and (13), we obtain
Optimizing (A2) with respect to x 1 (2) and x 2 (2), we obtain
which after comparing with (11) implies that the optimal matrix β (2) is diagonal
This is because all agents know that t = 2 is the last trading round before the fundamentals are revealed. Clearly, this is not the case for the first trading round, and, therefore, we do not expect β (1) to be diagonal. Substituting x * i (2) back into (A2) and optimizing it with respect to x 1 (1) and x 2 (1) yields
x * 2 (1) = arg max
where auxiliary x 1,2 (2) are defined as
Conditions (A5) and (A6) can be written in the matrix form as follows
Combining (A7) with (3), we finally obtain that β (1) can be found as a solution of the following fixed-point condition for
where I stands for the unit matrix.
We proceed with a proof in two steps. First, we guess that solution is symmetric
Second, we are going to verify that solution (A9) exists and satisfies all the necessary conditions. In the symmetric case, the fixed point condition (A8) is simplified to
and effectively represents a system of two equations for β + and
Next, we introduce new "auxiliary" variables
The subscript ± on a variable is used to represent two equations where in the first (second) equation the relevant variable with subscript ± is replaced by that variable with subscript + (−). Similarly if ± is used as an operator it means + in the first equation and − in the second equation. Therefore (A12) represents two equations:
. z + represents a rescaling of the expected informed trading intensity, β + + β − , and z − represents a rescaling of the difference between the within and across asset expected informed trading intensity, β + − β − . The properties of z ± which we will examine later simplify many of the following proofs. Next we guess that
Substituting both (A12) and (A13) back into the system (A11) yields a system of nonlinear equations for z ± . Next we verify that our guess for Λ ± is self-consistent. It can be easily shown that in the case of the symmetric solution matrix Ψ takes the following form
It follows from (9) that
which verifies (A13). Finally, using (A14) we find λ 1
and λ 2
which completes the proof. It is worthwhile to note that we have used equations (14) and (A25) in deriving (A17).
Proof:
We need to check the sign of 
We will need the following Lemma for our further proofs.
LEMMA 2: Order flows have the following variances
Var (y 1 (1)) = Var (y 2 (1)) = 1 + z 2 + + z 2 − 2 σ 2 u ,(A21)Var (y 1 (2)) = Var (y 2 (2)) = 2σ 2 u , Var (x 1 (1)) = Var (x 2 (1)) = z 2 + + z 2 − 2 σ 2 u , Var (x 1 (2)) = Var (x 2 (2)) = σ 2 u ,
Total order flows, y i (t), have the following covariances
Cov(y 1 (1) , y 1 (2)) = Cov(y 1 (1) , y 2 (2)) = 0
Price changes have the following covariances
Proof: Var (y 1 (1)) is equal to Var (y 2 (1)) by symmetry and can be calculated directly
Since Var (y 1 (1)) = Var (x 1 (1)) + σ 2 u the expression for Var (x 1 (1)) follows immediately. We can write x 1 (2) as
Then
Var (x 1 (2)) = 1 4λ
It can be easily verified that
Substituting (A27) into (A26) yields the desired result. Cov(y 1 (1) , y 2 (1)) can be obtained as follows
In order to prove that the total order flows are not correlated across time we note that using the symmetry of the solution (specifically that Var(y 1 (1)) = Var(y 2 (1))) the equations (8) can be written as
Substituting y 1 (2) into the covariance yields
We just need to show that Λ + Var(y 1 (1)) + Λ − Cov(y 1 (1) , y 2 (1)) = Cov( V 1 , y 1 (1)), which directly follows from (A29).
To prove the last identity note that ∆P 1 (2) can be written as
Consider now
It follows from (A30) that
which upon substitution into (A32) yields the desired result. Cov(y 1 (2) , y 2 (2)) can be obtained with a help of (A25) and (A27) as follows
, and the result follows immediately. Finally we find Cov(∆P 1 (2) , ∆P 2 (2)). Using (A31) we obtain
The result follows immediately after applying (A33) in (A35).
Proof of Proposition 1.
Because all variances are provided by Lemma 2, we only need to calculate all the necessary covariances in order to prove Proposition 1. We will use result of Lemma 2 that total order flows are not correlated across time (second relation in (A22)) to prove (22) Cov(y 1 (1) , y 1,2 (2)) = Cov(x 1 (1) + u 1 (1), x 1,2 (2)) (A36)
It immediately follows that
The lead-lag covariances of price changes are given by
Cov(∆P 1 (1) , ∆P 2 (2)) = λ 1 Λ − Var (y 1 (1)) + λ 1 (Λ + − λ 1 ) Cov(y 1 (1) , y 2 (1)).
Combining (A38) and (A33), we obtain
Taking into account that
we immediately obtain
(A41) combined with (A23) yields (21). The lead-lag covariances of informed order flows and returns are given by
which in combination with (A33) yields
Combining covariances with results of Lemma 2 completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2. Result for Cov (∆P p (1) , ∆P p (2)) and Cov (∆P p (1) , x p (2)) follow immediately from Proposition 1. Next we consider
and the result follows when we use (A37) in (A46). Finally, consider
and the result follows immediately. We need the following Lemma to prove Proposition 3. LEMMA 3: Portfolio informed order flows have the following variances
Portfolio price changes have the following variances
Var (∆P p (1)) = λ 2 1 1 + z 2 + 2 σ 2 u ,(A49)Var (∆P p (2)) = λ 2 2 σ 2 u + 1 2 Cov(y 1 (2) , y 2 (2)) + 2Λ 2 − 1 + z 2 + 1 + z 2 − 2 2 + z 2 + + z 2 − 2 .
Portfolio price changes and informed order flows have the following covariance
Proof: The variance of x p (1) can be calculated as follows
Var (x p (2)) is equal to
and the result follows. Other proofs are straightforward except for Var (∆P p (2)), which we proof next.
The result follows after substituting (A33) into (A32). Proof of Proposition 3: The VAR coefficients b 11 and b 12 are found from
We need to calculate
Next we find b 11
b 12 can be found analogously
We can now find b 22 and b 21 which are equal to
We obtain for b 21
Finally, we find b 22 as follows
The final results follow after substitution of z + and z − . Newey-West t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
.
on the left-hand side variable. All variables are daily. Market portfolios are formed each day by equally weighing returns/institutional order flow for all stocks with available data that day. Newey-West t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Italics indicate the F -statistics for the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients equals zero. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Institutional order flow is measured as a percent of a total market cap. within the same industry and 11 which are formed from stocks chosen from random industries. To focus on the industry-level effects we remove the market-level effects from the within industry and random portfolios by using the residuals from the regression of returns (order flows) of each portfolio on the market returns (order flows). To avoid creating correlation in the residuals across the industry and random categories portfolios in each group are regressed on the "market" formed from stocks only within the 11 portfolios in the same category. Panel A reports average correlation coefficients of returns, R i (t), and institutional order flow, x i (t), with their lagged counterparts for high ρ portfolios. Panel B reports average correlation coefficients of returns, R i (t), and institutional order flow,
, with their lagged counterparts for low ρ portfolios. The correlations are reported up to four lags in both cases.
Panel C reports the differences between the average correlation coefficients from Panels A and B. Italics indicate the F -statistics for the hypothesis that the sum of the correlation coefficients equals zero (Panels A and B) and that the difference is equal to zero (Panel C). Institutional order flow is measured as a fraction of a total market cap.
Coefficients are estimated at the same time using seemingly unrelated regressions; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. This table reports results of jointly estimating the following one-lag (Panel A, K = 1) and four-lag (Panel B, K = 4) vector autoregressions. We start with 12 Fama and French industry portfolios using daily data from January 1999 to December 2005 which we split into two groups of 11 portfolios each. For within industry portfolios (high ρ) we use the first 11 industries-everything but the "other" group. For the random portfolios (low ρ) we randomly divide stocks in the "other" group into 11 equal-sized portfolios. Because assets in this case are industry specific, they have a common industry component and thus proxy for assets with high ρ. We then remove a common market component from each portfolio by regressing its return (institutional order flow) on the market return (institutional order flow) and using the residuals. For each portfolio we calculate the daily equal-weighted returns, R i (t), and institutional order flow, xi(t). We estimate the following VAR for each portfolio:
Ri(t −
The results in panel A are for portfolios of firms within the same industry. at the same time using seemingly unrelated regressions; ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
One-Lag
Four-Lags R i (t − 1)
x i (t − 1) R i (t − 1 : t − 4) x i (t 
